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Plato's myths are care/ully chosen,
beauti/ully executed and /ully justified masterpieces 0/ philosophical
discourse - necessary elements 0/
the "Phaedrus" and the other
middle dialogues.

MYTH AND TRANSCENDENCE
IN PLATO
SISTER M. JOHN G,REGORY

PLATO IS UNDOUBTEDLY the greatest myth-maker in the history of
philosophy and perhaps, with the exception of Dante, the greatest
myth-maker in all of history. But Plato's myths present problems
which Dante's Divina Commedia does not, for myth is certainly a
legitirnate element in poetry and the Divina Commedia, whatever its
philosophical or theological significance, is, first and forernost, poetry.
The dialogues of Plato, however, whatever their poetic valence (and
it is admittedly great), are first and forernost philosophical discourse.
Although scholars disagree profoundly on the rneaning of the Platonic
myths, they agree that these rnyths are not literary devices or stylis-
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tic ornaments. The myths are integral to Platonic philosophy and, for
this reason, the problems they present must be studied if Plato is to be
understood.
The first problem with the Platonic myths is to understand their
role in Plato's philosophy. The second problem is to justify the use
of rnyth or poetry in a philosophical work, a justification that can
only be achieved by showing that they are not only integral to the
works in which they occur but specially suited to the philosophical
task at hand. A third problem, peculiar to Plato, arises from the fact
that he explicitly repudiated both the content and the written or
dramatic method of presentation of poetry in general and myth in
particular. How, then, even granting that poetic myth is a legitimate
philosophical device (which has not been established), can one justify Plato's use of written myth to convey his thought?
This article will attempt first to suggest aresolution of the lastmentioned difficulty. Then, having shown that Plato's use of myth is
consistent with his own philosophical principles and method, it will
attempt to handle the first two problems by analyzing a middle-period
myth (from the Phaedrus) in the context of a theory of myth in relation to Plato's doctrine of the transcendent. The analysis will attempt
to set forth and support the thesis that the myths are, for Plato, a philosophical method peculiarly weIl adapted for achieving the twofold
objective of the dialogues in which they occur. The analysis of the
Phaedrus myth will be followed by brief summary sketches of the
other three myths of the middle period designed to show that the
Phaedrus myth is not an isolated case hut a particularly clear example
of poetry-but only in others."l Kaufmann holds that Plato gave
I. THE PROBLEM OF MYTH IN PLATO

Num.erous passages in Plato are devoted to his attack upon poetry
in general and myth in particular. This attack is twofold. Plato objects
first and most strongly to the content of such literature. He objects
secondly to the method of its presentation, whether this be dramatic
presentation which fosters ill-regulated emotion or written presentation ",vh.ich, being static and imitative, is ill suited to teach the truth.
Plato hirnself, however, used poetic myth in his dialogues and, although he did not present his teaching on the stage he did present
it in ·writing. It has been suggested that Plato's practice was grossly
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inconsistent with his theory in respect to poetry. Walter Kaufmann,
in his analysis of the poetry paradox in Plato, calls hirn "the mythintoxicated protagonist of reason . . . [who] recognized the dangers
of poetry-but only in others."l Kaufmann holds that Plato gave
deliberate assent to Socrates' criticism of any but the dialectical
approach to knowledge but that Socrates' attitude "did not permanently satisfy the mind of Plato. His bent was too mystical and speculative, or in one word, too poetical."2 Kaufmann considers Plato, like
Nietzsche, a victim of his own poetic genius. He says that Plato's
irresistible poetic inspiration drove hirn to write, despite the example
of Socrates,3 and to write precisely the type of thing that Socrates
proscribed. Plato, he says, rivaled the very poets he condemned "not
only in his comprehensive visions and in the overall design of many
dialogues, but also in the continual abandonment of any pretense of
rational inquiry for the sake of what is frankly admitted to be mythe
Whether these myths draw freely on ancient lore or are invented on
the spur of the moment, it was surely not reason that fashioned them,
nor the lust for truth, but the poetic impulse."4 Furthermore, says
Kaufmann, Plato defeats the very purpose of his dialogues when "with
his beautiful images, ... [he] puts the critical sense to sleep."5
This position, which is shared by other critics of Plato, seems,
upon careful reading of Plato's own words about poetry and writing,
to be superficial. First, it seems highly unlikely that Plato was unaware of what he was doing in his use of poetry or in his use of
vvriting. The classical strife between poetry and philosophy among
the Greeks was in an advanced stage by the time Plato began to
write. The crux of the strife was the subject of tl1e attributes of the
gods,6 a subject to which Plato devoted considerable attention and
effort. Philosophers, notably Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, the sophists,
and Democritus, for various reasons and with various results, had
taken strong stands against the myths. And the "Homeridae" had
advanced equally strong claims that the poetry of Homer was the

1 W. Kaufmann, "Philosophy versus Poetry," From Shakespeare to Existentialism:
Studies in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy (Boston, 1959), pp. 240, 244.

2Ibid., p. 245.

3

Ibid., p. 247.

5

I bid., p. 246.

6

James Adam, The Religious Teachers

el

4

Ibid., p. 242.

Greece (Edinburgh, 1908), p. 4.
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quintessence of moral and religious teaching. 7 It seems hardly possible that Plato could have been unconscious of the conflict or insensible to the relation of his own work to it. James Adam says, in fact,
that "it is precisely in Plato, who more than any other Greek author
unites the poet and the philosopher, that this hostility to Greek poetry
is most: marked."8 Perhaps, however, he suggests a basic reason for
the, type of misunderstanding represented by Kaufmann when he
observes that the works of Plato have suffered more at the hands of
professional allegorizers than any other work except the Pentateuch. 9
But the fact that Plato's works have been illegitimately "poetized"
is not Plato's fault and indicates no weakness in his works themselves.
It certainly does not suggest that Plato was unaware of the philosophypoetry confIict or that, swept along by poetic inspiration, he wrote
poetry without being aware that he was writing it or that he was
writing it into his philosophical works. If Plato wrote poetry in his
philsophical works he did it on purpose.
Secondly, Plato nowhere violates his own expressed position in
regard to either poetry or writing. Plato objected to poetry in general and to myths in particular for two reasons: they were untrue and
they were conducive to immorality. Most of the myths and tragedies
were untrue because they presented the gods as indifferent to men or
as immoral and inconstant. 10 Furthermore, since mytl1s, especially
those of Horner and Hesiod, were almost the sole content of orthodox
theology/l and the tragedies, especially those of Aeschylus, were
almost the sole vehicles of moral teaching in Plato's day/2 these
untrue doctrines of the gods were, in his opinion, powerful incentives
to immorality. That Plato considered the myths untrue is plain. He
says that the story that the gods stole from one another "is a tale
with neither truth nor semblance of truth about it."13 Homer and

Ibid., pp. 1-2, 11-12.
Ibid., p. 3.
9 Ibid., p. 15.
10 George F. Thomas, Religious Philosophies 0/ the West (New York, 1965), p. 3. See
also lohn E. Rexine, Religion in Plato and Cicero (New York, 1959), pp. 53-55.
11 Adam, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
7

8

12 D. D. Raphael, "The Philosopher as Dramatist-Plato and the Greek Drama," "The
Paradox 0/ Tragedy (Indiana, 1960), p. 89.
13 Plato, Laws XII, 941b. Trans. A. E. Taylor in The Collected Dialogues 0/ Plato including the Letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York, 1961). All
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Hesiod, says Plato, "composed false stories which they told and still
tell mankind" (Rep. 11, 377d). In particular, Plato regarded Hesiod's
account of the gory feud of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus as "the greatest
lie" (Rep. 11, 377e). Such stories he also refers to as "errors" and
"follies" (Rep. 11, 379d), and as "perverse imaginations" (Critias,
109b). The reason for his position is simple and clear. Plato, by
dialectic, had "proved ... that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility" (Rep. 111, 391d, e). Therefore, what he says of Asclepius,
son of Apollo, who reportedly took abribe, is true for all gods and
children of gods: "If he was the son of a god he was not avaricious
... and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god" (Rep.
111, 408c). Evil and divinity, Plato maintains, are strict contradictories.
Not only were these stories false, but, according to Plato, they
were encouragements to personal and social immorality. They encouraged impiety toward parents (Euthyphro, 6b; Laws X, 886c,d),
contention and greediness among citizens (Critias, 109b) , rapes and
atrocities of all kinds (Rep. 111, 391d) because, by referring to the
myths, one who did such things could maintain that he did "no deed
of shame, but an act such as is done by the very gods themselves"
(Laws XII, 941b). Therefore, "even if they were true" (which they
are not), such stories must not be told in the model state (Rep. 11,
378a, b).
This twofold objection to the literature of Greece, however, cannot be made to support the position that Plato rejected all myth and
poetry. Plato was indifferent to myths that were not doctrinally objectionable 01' morally debilitating. He says, "we may dismiss the primitive stories without more ado; let thern be told in any way heaven
pleases" (Laws X, 886d). In answer to Phaedrus' question about
whether he believed the rnyth of Boreas seizing Orithyia, Plato,
through the rnouth of Socrates as usual, says that he has no time for
the pseudo-scientific rnyth-smas11ing of the contemporary atheists and
he certainly cannot verify the accounts. "Consequently I don't bother
about such things, but accept the current beliefs about them" (Phaedrus, 229c-230a) .
Furthermore, Plato 11eld that true rnyths were the result of a "divine
subsequent references to the writings of Plato will be indicated by dialogue and number given in parentheses immediately after the quotation in the text of the paper.
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madness" (Phaedrus, 265a) or inspiration by the Muses. Such myths
were substantially true. Socrates says to Phaeclrus about the myth
of that dialogue, which he calls "a mythical hymn of praise," that by
it "we attained some degree of truth, though we may weIl have sometimes gone astray-the blend resulting in a discourse which had some
claim to plausibility" (Phaedrus, 265 b,c) .14 Not only were some
myths true but some were conducive to morality and to be encouraged 15 as we read in tl1e Republic: "And the stories on the accepted
list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so
shape their souls by these stories" (11, 377c). It seems then, that
Plato, in telling myths which, as will be shown below, he believed to
be substantially true and morally elevating,16 did not in practice
repudiate his theoretical objections to myth, for he was not using the
type of myth to which he objected.
For analogous reasons it must also be denied that Plato contradicted hirnself on the subject of writing. It is scarcely possible that
Plato would not have seen a blatant inconsistency between his prohibition of writing in the Seventh Letter and his written dialogues
or between the admonition at the close of the Thirteenth Letter and
the doctrine of the Seventh Letter if such an inconsistency existed.
How could he have written, "Preserve this letter, either itself or a
memorandum of it" (Let. XIII, 363e), if he conceded no function
to written works? But even if this closing admonition with its immediately preceding injunction to attend to the subject matter of his
written communications were an inadvertent contradiction, the long
passage in Letter VII (341, c-e) in which he maintains, "I have
certainly composed no work in regard to it [his philosophy] nor
shall 1 ever do so in future, for there is no way of putting it in words
like other studies," cannot be explained as an oversight. Either Plato
did not have even normal intelligence or else he did not intend to
proscribe the type of writing which his dialogues are. History inclines one against the former opinion.
Plato objected to writing for two reasons, closely analogous to
his reasons for rejecting false mythe He objected to writing because
it was not true, or at least was so far from the truth as to do more
14 The problem of truth in PIatonie myths will be taken up at the
15 Friedrich Solmsen, Plato's Theology (New York, 1942), p. 132.
16 Ibid., p. 66.

end of Part IIa.

MYTH IN PLATO

279

harm than good. And he objected to its effects on the readers. First,
Plato maintained that ordinary writing is in the same category as
painting, namely, at least three removes from the Forms which it
represents. 17 According to Plato the Forms are known by the philosopher whose characteristic artifact is the word-picture. This wordpicture in the mind is the most direct representation of the Forms
and is expressed in philosophical discourse. The craftsman, in producing a material thing, also imitates the Forms, but not as weIL
The artist, who imitates the material thing which is an imitation of
the Form, is so far removed from the truth that the representation is
faint at best. 18 And one who studies the painting or written work is
producing in his own mind an even foggier representation. Thus
Plato's lack of esteem for the imitative artist, whether painter or poet.
However, not all artistic writers, according to Plato, are imitative in
the pejorative sense. In the Phaedrus the poet is presented as one
under divine inspiration (265a). In the same dialogue, when Plato
gives the rank of various reincarnation patterns, he places the "fol..
lower of the Muses," that is, the poet, in the first category with the
philosopher and "the poet or other imitative artist" in the sixth
(238d,e). It would seem, then, that for Plato there is imitative and
nonimitative writing. He rejects only that writing which is, as he
teIls Phaedrus, "truly analogous to painting." Such pieces, like
paintings, "seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but
if you ask them anything about what they say, from adesire to be
instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever"
(275d). Such writing is the kind that Phaedrus unwisely extolled in
the speech of Lysias, thereby exciting Socrates to a blasphemous
speech against the god of Love. Those, however, "vho write under the
direct inspiration of the Muses are under a most direct influence of
the Forms. Plato, in his myths, is in this latter category. As for his
dialogues, they are not imitations of anything. They are the wordpicture of the philosopher, the truest possible representations of the
Forms, set down on paper.
Furthermore, Plato's works do not violate his principles regarding
17

Rexine, op. eit., p. 53.

18 See David Gallup, "Image and Reality in Plato's Republic," Archiv tür Geschichte
der Philosophie, 47 (1965), 123 for an interesting diagram of Plato's theory of representation.
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the effects of written works on the readers. Philosophy, says Plato,
must come about in a person through long "attendance on instruction
in the subject itself and ... close companionship" from which "suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the
soul and at once becomes self-sustaining" (Let. VII, 341d). If it
comes through written explanation it will fall into the wrong hands
(Phaedrus, 275e) and "excite in some an unjustified contempt . . .
in others certain lofty and vain hopes, as if they had acquired some
awesome lore" (Let. VII, 342a). This will happen, he goes on to
explain, because of the imitative nature of writing which is far
removed from the truth. However, Plato's own dialogues, of which
bis myths are part, are not imitative treatises open to misinterpretation by his readers. They are dialogues in which the reader is a
participant. If the reader participates, philosophy will be born in
hirn in much the same way it would be in one who sat at the feet
of Socrates. If the reader cannot or does not participate he will not
have any more idea what is being said than a nonattentive interlocutor at a Socratic dialogue, for the dialogues of Plato do not instruct;
they suggest the direction of the truth and turn the attention of the
student toward it. Hence, there is no danger that the nonparticipant
reader w~ll suffer the ill effects of reading an imitative philosophicaI
treatise.
It would seem, in conclusion, that whatever other objections may
be lodged against the myths of Plato he cannot be condemned out
of his own mouth. He repudiated myths that were false and morally
degrading and prodllced myths that were substantially true and
lTIorally elevating. He condemned writing as a method of conveying
philosophy because it was imitative and open to misunderstanding
and abuse by the unintelligent or the unvirtuous. He wrote dialogues
which ",,yere not imitative but fresh as the spoken word, true to the
,vord-picture in the mind of the philosopher and which would either
kindIe the spark of philosophy in participant readers or be completely lost on the inattentive and hence immune from misunderstanding and abuse.
II. MYTH AND TRANSCENDENCE

Having justified Plato's use of myth from the point of view of
its consistency with his own doctrine and method, we turn to the

MYT~'~

281

IN PLATO

more diffieult task of investigating the myth as a genuinely philosophical method für dealing with the transeendent. First, we will
diseuss myth itself in an attempt to set forth its peeuliar potentialities
for transeendental discourse ; seeond, we will discuss the transeendent in Plato in an attempt to show the peculiar aptitude of his
doctrine for mythical explanation.

A. Myth as Philosophical Method
Myth has played an important part in every known civilization.
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in mythography
and such a confusing proliferation of theories and interpretations
that it is seemingly impossible to find any commonly accepted definition, classification, theory of origin, or theory of use in regard to
myth. 19 Nevertheless, it is necessary to attempt some synthesis on the
subjeet in order to make any judglnent about the role of myth In
Plato.
The orIgIn of myth is sl1rouded in the mystery of the dawn of
human consciousness but it seems to be basically the approach of
Inan to a world witl1 which he is in vital eontinuity, which is not an
"it" but a "thou," which is, in short, living and active. 20 In nature,
myth is generally considered to be poetie but there is no consensus
about whether it is the poetry of ritual, the poetic history of some
important personage, the poetic stage in the development of rational
thought, poetic folklore, or simply a poetry whieh beautifies the
inadequacies of prin1itive science. 21 The funetion of myth may be
to entertain, to explain, or to tackle esehatological problems. 22 More
important for our purposes than the origin, nature, or function of
myth is the form of myth and its subjeet matter. Walter Ong has a
very provoeative theory of myth whieh suggests that it is a form of
expression which exploits the potential eoeffieient in finite being
through the eeonomy of indireetion. What he means by this is that a
finite being "is not self-contained, not pure aet, but is faeed outward
19 Herhert Weisinger, "Some Meanings of Myth," The Agony and the Triumph: Papers
on the Use and Abuse 0/ Myth (Michigan, 1964), p. 204.
20 H. and H. A. Frankfort, "Myth and Reality," The Intelleetual Li/e
(Chicago, 1965), pp. 4-7.

21

Aneient Man

Weisinger, op. eit.

lohn Alexander Stewart, The Myths
31-38.
22

0/

0/

Plato, ed. G. R. Levy (Illinois, 1960), pp.
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to other things-ultimately to GOd."23 This "facing outward" is the
coefficient of potentiality in things, a dimension of reality which
cannot be dealt with in the direct language of philosophy and science
by which we express the explicit truth of the actual insofar as it is
actual, but whose implicit truth can be hinted at through the indirect
language of symbol and image. 24 That in man's experience which is
most "potential" is his relation with the transcendent and this perhaps suggests why myth has been most often and most profoundly
associated (as it is in Plato) with the transcendent. The "economy of
indirection" which hints at implicit truth is symbolic, metaphorical,
pictorial, imaginative. However, none of these adjectives suggests
that the myth-maker is talking in representations. Mythical formulations do not simply stand for the truth; they express the truth. 25
Perhaps from these few background notions it will be possible to
piece together a minimum description of the form and content of
myth with which to approach Plato's work. 26
First, let us say what myth is not. Almost all modern authorities
agree that myth is not simply a story or an inaccurate account of
natural phenomena. 27 Neither is it an allegory although allegory
functions occasionally as "ineidental material" within a myth. 28
Allegory is an illustrative image rendering pictorially results which
have been obtained by argument. 29 It is, therefore, in the line of
abstraction, of direct expression of explicit truth. so Further, myth is

23 Walter J. Ong, 5.}., "The Myth of Myth: Dialogue with the Unspoken," The Barbarian Within (New York, 1962), p. 135.
24 Ibid., pp. 136-137. Ong opposes myth to philosophy but the very reason he gives for
the opposition seems to me to be the reason why Plato used myth for philosophical purposes, namely, that the philosophical truths which he treated in myth were susceptible
only of an indirect approach.
25 William Flint Thrall and Addison Hibbard, A Handbook to Literature, rev. and enlarged C. Hugh Holman (New York, 1960), p. 299.
26 The background for the following paragraph is derived from Frankfort, op. eit., p. 8;
Ingo Hermann, Eneounters with the New Testament, trans. Raymond Meyerpeter (New
York, 1964), p. 29; Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols (New York, 1961), pp. 11, 15;
and from general references on mythology.
27 Thrall and Hibbard, op. cit., p. 299.
28 5tewart, op. eit., p. 14.
29 I bid., pp. 28.
30 Ong, op. cit., p. 139.
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not a parable or fable because it has no meaning or moralother than
itself. Myths cannot and should not be interpreted in the way parables are 3l and such interpretation is one of the chief injustices that
has been done to the works of Plato throughout the centuries.
Myth can be defined, tentatively, as a "tissue of symbolism clothing a mystery."32 Symbol, metaphor, and analogy are the basic constituents of the myth-form. Symbols are presentational without heing
abstractive. They are translucent to the reality they present, partaking
of what they render present. Metaphor is a kind of verbal symbol
which is particularly weIl adapted to the economy of indirection
which is characteristic of myth. 33 Analogy, which is simply an extended metaphor, is likewise an important element in the mythical
form. Myths are usually, but not necessarily, narrative in form. Historical referents, use of authority (for example, Homeric quotations
in Plato's myths), and the incorporation of details of contemporary
science (for example, the suspension theory of the earth's placement
in the Phaedo myth) are techniques in the mythical form used to
enhance its credibility but, like narration, are not essential to it. In
short, what is essential to the mythical form is poetic symbolism.
In regard to the content of myth, namely, mystery, the picture is
infinitely more difficult to delineate and much more important. Basically, myth is concerned with the transcendent, with vihat John Stewart
calls the "a priori elements in man's experience"34 or what Clifton
Collins calls simply "the unseen realities transcending all mortal
experienee."35 At risk of grossly oversimplifying man's riehest experiences, one could say that man has a t,vofold relation with the
infinite, cognitive and mystical. Man seeks to know that which is
beyond hirn and to participate in it. Myth is concerned with both
aspects of the relation.
Man comes to know the transcendent ultimately only through
some kind of revelation, either supernatural revelation such as that
given to Diotima as recounted in the Symposium or the natural exStewart, op. eit., p. 39.
R. Y. Hathorn, "Myth and Mystery," Tragedy, Myth and Mystery (Indiana, 1962),
p.25.
33 Ong, op. eit., p. 139.
31

32

34 Stewart, op. eit., p. 213.
35 Clifton W. Collins, Plato

(New York, 1883), p. 131.
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perience of standing "as a finitude in the midst of an infinite cosmos
... [with which] he has simultaneous relations of conjunction and
discontinuity."36 Socrates seemed to have been absorbed in some such
encounter with the transcendent just before entering the banquet
chamber of Agathon in the Symposium. Myth is both a means of
thinking about ,vhat is grasped in the transcendental experience and
a method of expressing it. Plato acknowledges his use of myth as a
tool of thought in several places. A notable example from the Lalvs
is the Athenian's answer to the question on the nature of the supremely good soul: "Let us beware of creating a darkness at noonday for ourselves by gazing, so to say, direct at the sun as we give our
answer, as though we could hope to attain adequate vision and perception of wisdom with mortal eyes. It will be the safer course to
turn our gaze on an image of the object of our quest" (X, 897 d) .
Sometirnes the myth-image can function as a kind of model or para..
digm of reality with which to think about that reality.37 In whatever
way the myth is used the thinker selects the symbols of the myth
rationally according to their appropriateness. The principle of appro..
priateness is both rational and affective,38 rational because the mind
sees that the symbol is somehow what one is thinking about and
affective because it is a feeling-response to reality as a value rather
than a logical or scientific response. 39
But thinking about the transcendent is not the totality of the cog..
nitive relation, for the thinker must also communicate his grasp of
the world beyond. Myth is a method of expressing symbolically what
one has grasped. It is not an abandonment of thought (as Kaufmann
suggested) but it is thought in a different key. The reader feels
... when ... Socrates or another great interlocutor opens his mouth in Myth,
that the movement of the Philosophie Drama is not arrested, but is being
sustained, at a crisis, on another plane. The Myth bursts in upon the Dialogue
with a revelation of something new and strange; the narrow, matter-of..fact,
\vorkaday experience, which the argumentative conversation puts in evidence,

36 Hathorn, ap. eit., p. 29.
37 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "Athenes

et l'Atlantide. Structure et signification d'un mythe
platonicien," Revue des Etudes Greeques, 77 (1964), for example of an exploration of
the use of Iuyth as a "thought model."
38 Hathorn, ap. eit., p. 26.

39 Stewart, ap.

eit., pp. 44-45.
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is suddenly flooded, as it were, and transfused by the inrush of a vast experience, as from another world-"Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the
place whereon thou standest is holy ground." 40

Knowing the transcendent and communicating one's grasp still
does not exhaust man's relation to the other. There is a longing to
participate. Myth, among primitive peoples, is often the catechesis of
ritual, the verbal dimension of initiation. Plato's interest in the Forms
extends far beyond adesire to know about them. He is motivated by
"the desire of the mystic to unite himself with the eternal"41 as weIl
as to bring all the members of the state to a participation in the Good.
But for Plato myth functioned differently from the way it did for
the votaries of the Mysteries. For them the rites were the means of
salvation and myth explained and made present for mind and emotion what was being accomplished sacrarnentally by the ritual. For
Plato the myth itself, as we shall see, is the means of salvation because contemplation of the Forms is the primary mode of participation rather than any rite of initiation,42 and it is precisely by and in
myth that one contemplates that which is not of this world.
The content of myth, then, is seen to be a cognitive and Inystical
relation to the transcendent. The revelation of the Absolute is penetrated more and more profoundly by means of imaginative cognition
or "mythical thinking" and communicated in the myth form. The
Absolute is reached mystically through myth-irradiated ritual or
mythopoeic contemplation.
Stewart develops these basic notions on the eontent of myth in
their application to the Platonic myths at great length in the Introduction to The Myths 0/ Plato. 43 He defines "transcendental feeling"
as the "solemn sense of the immediate presence of 'That which was,
and is, and ever shall be' " experienced in a kind of waking dream
that transports us to world where time is not, just long enough to
create the impression, at the mOInent of "waking," that the things of
this world are inlages of that other world. The myth itself "regulates"
the transcendental feeling, helps the "waking dreamer" to organize
the content of his experience, and then afIords hirn a suitable vehicle
40

Ibid., p. 25.

41 Thomas, op. eit.,
42 Stewart, op. eit.,
43

Ibid., pp. 46-70.

p. 9.
p. 14. (This reference is to the Introduction by Levy.)
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for setting it forth and inducing in the hearer or reader the same
transeendental feeling. This seems a very clear analysis of Plato's
use of myth, particularly in the middle dialogues in which he gathers
his interlocutors up into a veritable waking dream that transports
them into the upper world, makes them witnesses of judgment and
reincarnation, and returns them to the present with a certitude that
that which they have experienced in myth is truly there and more
real than the fleeting shadows of this lower world. 44
The final question regarding myth, and crucial one when myth is
an integral part of philosophy, is that of its truth-value. The question
arises because myth is frequently difficult to interpret45 and, at least
in Plato, occurs so frequently in the context of tentative conclusions46
that it seems to be almost a function of intellectual insecurity. But
this intellectual insecurity is not doubt. It is the coupling of adamant
convietion with a sense of intellectual weakness before the mystery
of transcendence. Myths are not in the order of demonstration but of
faith. They set forth the content of revelation, not of empirical research. They are religious, not scientific. Myths are Plato's way of
discussing the "Truth which he believes and feels, but cannot precisety [sie] define."47 But there is no question about the truth of the
myths in the mind of Plato. To hirn they are on a par with science in
truth-value,48 although the truth is of a different order. The only real
question is one of facticity and this question is really irrelevant
for the "facts" of the myths are strictly unverifiable, and even if
they could be verified such verification would add nothing to the
mythe In fact, verification would probably detract by destroying
the dreamlike quality by which the myth induces and sustains
the contact with the transcendent as weIl as by obviating any
44 Kaufnlann contends that Plato's philosophy was frequently only a meditation on ,and
explication of his poetic experiences (p. 247). He considers this a philosophical wcakness (p. 213) due to a poetic strength. But I think Stewart's explanation of the nlyth
as the regulator of transcendental feeling accounts for Plato's philosophical reflections
on his poetry just as weIl as Kaufmann's theory and does less violence to the dialogues
themselves.
45 Thomas, op. eit., p. 13.
46 James Kern Feibleman, Religio,us Platonism; The Infiuenee 0/
and the In/luenee 0/ Plato on Religion (London, 1959), p. 23.
47 Collins, op. eit., p. 13l.
48 Solrnsen, op. eit., p. 146. (This reference occurs in footnote 1.)
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need for revelation. Verifiahle realities are not transcendent. Plato
himself teIls us all that is relevant when he calls the myths "likely
accounts" (Timaeus, 290) and teIls us that "This or something very
like it is true" (Phaedo, 114d). In other words, the details of a myth
are not to he taken literally hut the myth is to he taken seriously49
precisely hecause it is true.
By way of summary of this complicated matter let us accept
George Whalley's description of myth given in Poetic Process for it
seems to include all the elements of myth relevant to Platonic myth:
[Myth] is a direct metaphysical statement beyond seience. It embodies in
an articulated structure of symbol or narrative avision of reality. It is a eondensed aecount of man's Being and attempts to represent reality with structural fidelity, to indieate at a single stroke the salient and fundamental
relations which for a man constitute reality. . . . Myth is not an obseure,
olbique, or elaborate way of expressing reality-it is the ornly way. Myth has
as its purpose, its source and end, revelation; myth is not make-believe but
the most direet and positive assertion of belief that man can discover. 50

B. The Transcendent in Plato
Before investigating the dialogues of the middle period to see how
myth is there used as a method of dealing with the transcendent it will
he helpful to state hriefly, in nonsymholic terms, what the transcendent emhraces in Platonic philosophy. Plato's entire theory of the
transcendent seems to he a function of his "struggle to uphold the
validity of knowledge, with its corollary of the existence of areal
and stahle object to be known. . . . "51 It is not surprising, then, that
the principal occupants of Plato's transcendental world are the Forms,
tbe stahle ohjects of knowledge. Plato also speaks of gods, of God, of
the cosmos, of the human soul, and of that which is real in material
things as transcendental.
The Forms are the most clearly delineated elements in Plato's
world of the transcendent. They are "absolute, separate, simple,
eternal, immutahle, intelligihle ohjects independent hoth of the mind
which knows them and of the actualities which are their copies."52
The Forms are uni versals, impersonal and static,53 and are superior
49 Thomas, op.
50
51

52

cit., p. 11.
Quoted by Weisinger, op. cit., p. 200.
W. K. C. Guthrie, The Creeks and Their Cods (Boston, 1951), p. 351.
Feiblem,an, op. cit., p. 27.
53 Thomas, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
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to the gods who are particular, personal, and dynamic. The Forms are
formal causes, the gods, efficient causes, so to speak. 54 It is hard to
reconcile Plato's attribution of static impersonality to the Forms
with the fact that, while he reverences the gods, he loves only the
Forrrls. 55 The Forms constitute, together, a hierarchical system with
mathematical objects at the base and the Good at the summit where
it stands in a relation to the other Forms analogous to that of the sun
to the sensible world (Rep. VI, 509).56 The true task of philosophy
is to define each of the Forms, to grasp their interrelations, and
eventually to comprehend the entire system,57 a comprehension which
is eternallife.
The remainder of Plato's transcendent scheme is less clear. Whatever is real is so because of its relation to the Forms. Exactly what
relation to the Forms gods, things, the world, and the soul enjoy
presents a problem. First, although Plato speaks of gods and of God,
it is not clear whether he was a polytheist or a monotheist. Friedrich
Solmsen has a good point when he says that Plato's equation of
goodness, oneness, and divinity, if carried to its logical conclusion,
would have led Plato to monotheism 58 hut there is no evidence that
Plato carried it to its conclusion. Actually, it seems that Plato, like
the other Greeks of his time, simply was not concerned with the
number of gods,59 although he was deeply interested in the nature
of divinity. At any rate, the gods v/ere souls who actually existed,
were intelligent, efficient, and purposeful causes of the world and
morally good guardians of men. 60 God, on the other hand, in many
contexts seems to he equated with the Demiurge of the Timaeus or
the Cause of the Mixture in the Philebus who, as supreme Mind,
fashions cosmos out of chaos according to the model of the Forms. 61
This (;'od is presented as supremely GOOd. 62 The equation of God and

54

Solmsen, op. eit., pp. 72-73.

55

Thomas, op. eit., p. 2l.

56 Feibleman, op.
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eit., pp. 27-23.
Thornas, op. eit., p. 4.
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Solmsen, op. eit., p. 70.

59 Guthrie,
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Rexine, op. eit., pp. 28-29. See also Thomas, op. eit., p. 19.

61 J ohn M. Rist, "The Immanence and Transcendence of the Platonic Form," Philologus,108 (1964), 23l.
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Good presents problems, however, because Good is the supreme Form
and, according to the Republic, transcends being,63 whereas the minds
or gods are beings inferior to the Forms. 1t would seem that God
must be either the supreme Mind or the supreme Form but not both.
Andre Festugiere suggests the even more complicated idea that God
is not only supreme Form or Good but that this Good is the soul of
the Cosmos 64 while Adam suggests that the supreme god or Mind is
the world-soul for Plato, as intimated in Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and
Socrates. 65 In other words, it is not clear whether God is the supreme
Form according to which all else is fashioned, the supreme Mind
who fashions all, or the world-soul which realizes both Good and
Intellect in the cosmos. Whatever the word "God" means, however, it
or he is transcendent, either completely transcendent as Good or
Demiurge, or transcendent-immanent as world-soul.
There is no doubt that, according to Plato, the world is besouled
and that the soul of the world is living, intelligent, and morally good.
Strangely enough, although these are personal attributes, Plato does
not seem to have regarded the world-soul as a personal being. 66
This perhaps helps to account for the confusion discussed above. The
world-soul is Formlike in its impersonality and Godlike in its intelligence and moral goodness.
The knottiest question of all is the relation between the Forms
and the particulars which participate in them or imitate them. Platonic scholars never tire of speculating on this problem and conflicting interpretations are numerous. One thing is accepted by all
and that is that whatever relation things have to Forms, Forms remain completely separate and transcendent for the Forms are not
only universals in ,vhich particulars somehow participate but they
are also ideals or norms which particulars only approximate. 67 John
Rist's article entitled "The 1mmanence and Transcendence of the
Platonic Form" is a fascinating attempt to show that the Forms, while
remaining transcendent, are yet truly immanent in some way, giving
reality to particulars which, although ontologically defective, are
63 Andre Marie-Jean Festugiere, O.P., Personal Religion Among the Creeks (Los
Angeles, 1954), p. 44.
64 Ibid., p. 49.
65 Adam, op. eit., p. 371.
66
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nevertheless real and really what they are. 68 At any rate, the world
of things is not nonbeing to Plato; it is a mixture of being and nonbeing about which we can have only opinion, but which is an important stepping stone to the world of true being in which it shares.
The final, and for our purposes, most important element in the
transcendent realm of Plato is the human soul. The soul, according
to Plato, is a composite of immortal reason, and mortal higher and
lower appetite. In its highest part it is naturally immortal, ungenerated and incorruptible, and dwelt before its incarnation in the company of the gods in the upper world where it enjoyed, at least intermittently, the vision of the Forms. Owing to a fall for which it is
responsible it is incarnated and lives in this world for a time in order
to be purified and thus readied for areintegration with the upper
world. This purification, which comes about through philosophyreligion, normally requires several lifetimes, but issues eventually
for the good man in areturn to the life of blessed immortality among
the gods in contemplation of the Forms. The dialogues which we are
about to analyze are specially concerned with the nature, history,
destiny, and activity of the soul and Plato's entire treatment of the
transcendent will be seen, as it were, through the prism of the soul.
Therefore, further elucidation at this point is unnecessary.
111. MYTH AND TRANSCENDENCE IN THE "PHAEDRUS"

Having shown in Part I that Plato's use of myth is consistent with
his own principles, and having explicated in Part 11 the form, content, and objective of myth as a method of relating to the transcendent and reviewed Plato's notions of the transcendent, we turn now
to the central thesis of this paper: that the Phaedrus myth (which is
typical of the myths of the middle dialogues) is a method of dealing
with the transcendent which is more suitable for achieving Plato's
philosophical objectives than purely dialectical discourse and is,
therefore, fully justified. The method for supporting this thesis will
be, first, to show that the section of the dialogue which is being treated
is truly mythical in form; second, to show that the subjects with which
the section deals are transcendents in Plato's frame of reference;
third, to show that Plato's objective in treating the subjects is the
same as that which we have seen to be the objective of myth, namely,
68
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the establishment of eognitive and partieipational relation with the
transeendent. If this third point ean be established, then it should
follow that myth, in this ease, is not simply an arbitrary deviee of
Plato's style but a justified ehoiee of means to his end.
In Phaedrus, (246a-257a) we find the master-myth of Plato's
works, a myth dealing "with everything that ean be dealt with by a
myth".69 It begins in an atmosphere of religious awe and with strong
hints that what is to be said is prophetie. Soerates has just given a
speech exalting nonlove over love when he is suddenly eonseious of
his "familiar divine sign. All at onee," he says, "I seemed to hear a
voiee, forbidding me to leave the spot until 1 had made atonement
for some offense to heaven" (242e). The offense, of course, was his
speech against the god of love. Soerates then announees to Phaedrus,
"I am aseer," and proeeeds to reeall that an aneient mode of purifieation after a false or blasphemous discourse was to tell a true
"tale." Soerates, then, will antieipate punishment by telling such a
purifieatory tale (243a, b). Thus, the discourse on love begins in an
eneounter with the divine in whieh, as we have seen, all myth takes
its rise. Soerates, a prophet, overeome by the transcendental feeling
of "awe of Love himself" (243d) sets out to hymn the god, sweeping
his young listener, Phaedrus, with hirn into the realm of the divine.
The myth proper follows immediately upon a Platonie proof for
the immortality of the soul from its self-motion (245e-246a). This
latter is elearly a deliberate preparation for the myth. That it is
meant to be a demonstration is evident from its deductive formulation as weIl as from Plato's eonelusion: "if this last assertion is eorreet, namely that 'that whieh moves itself' is preeisely identifiable
with soul, it must follow that soul is not born and does not die"
(246a). In the next sentenee there is a shift from the demonstrative
mode of dialeetie to the mythieal mode of symbolie indireetion. The
next question, says Plato, is the nature of the soul and "What manner
of thing it is would be a long tale to tell, and most assuredly a god
alone eould tell it, but what it resembles, that a man might tell in
briefer eompass. Let this, therefore, be our n1anner of discourse. Let
it be likened to the union of powers in a team of winged steeds," ete.
(246b). To be noted are the referenee not to proof but to a "tale";
not to that whieh man ean lay hold on by reason but to that whieh
69
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"assuredly a god alone could tell," that is, to that which must be revealed; not to what the nature of the soul is but to "what it resembles"; not to what must follow but to what it can "be likened to."
Evidently, Plato intends to treat the problem of the nature of the
soul hy symholical rather than by dialectical methods.
That what follows is truly a myth can be seen from the plethora
of mythical elements which occurs throughout the long passage. The
account is narrative, its unity being sustained by the complex allegory of the soul-chariot. Number symbolism is prominent in this
myth, especially in the nine-Ieveled hierarchy of reincarnation patterns (248d, e) which is reminiscent of the numerical representation
of the superiority of the philosopher over the tyrant in the Republic
( 587d, e). The philosopher is 729 (cube of nine) times happier than
the tyrant. This number symbolism is closely related to the astronomical eschatology of the Phaedrus myth which is traceable, no
doubt, to the Pythagorean Orphics in whom number symbolism is so
prominent. 70 Another mythical touch is the casual reference to Homer
(252c) which is not, in this case, an appeal to authority but an indirect indication that Plato intends his own myth to replace Homer's
for he says of Homer's version, "You may believe that or not, as you
please; at all events the cause and the nature of the lover's experience
are in fact what I have said." Finally, in concluding the myth, Plato
says, through Socrates, "some of its language . . . was perforce
poetical" (257a). These few examples suffice to indicate that the
passage we are considering is indeed a mythe
The reason for this mythical treatment, as Plato hirnself says, is
that the topics to be treated are beyond the scope of rational demonstration and actually require to be revealed. In other words, the
topics are transcendent. Phaedrus and Socrates set out to determine
the nature of the soul, that in man which transcends the mortal body
and which originally "had wings" whose natural property "is to
raise that which is heavy and carry it aloft to the region where the
gods dweIl" and which "more than any other bodily part . . . shares
in the divine nature, which is fair, wise, and good" (246e). This
leads immediately to a description of the celestial paradise, the "geographical location" of the world of transcendence, if one may so
speak.
70
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Of that place heyond the heavens none of our earthly poets has yet sung,
and none shall sing worthily. But this is the manner of i t, for assuredly we
must be hold to speak what is true, above all when our discourse is upon
truth. It is there that true being dweIls, without color or shape, that cannot
be touched; reason alone, the soul's pilot, can behold it and all true knowledge
is knowledge thereof (247d).

This passage shows clearly the relation of myth to transcendence.
The upper world is a subject for poetry and in a sense is even beyond
the power of poetry. Nevertheless, it is truth, not fantasy, which the
poet sings and it is the truth about a spiritual realm which is the sole
ohject of true knowledge.
In the upper world dweIl gods and pre-existent souls whose mode
of life Plato mythically explores through symbol and metaphor. In
these regions Truth is their food (248c) and the gods lead the souls
of the mortals to pasture in Truth (248a). But, alas, not all souls
can sustain this life and their fall is recounted in symbol as the inahility of the winged charioteer to control his evil steed. Necessity,
executor of the sentence of incarnation, is mythically personified
and the levels of reincarnation are set forth in symbolic numbers.
The punitive incarnations are followed by thousand-year intervals
of purification presided over by personified Justice. Then follow
new incarnations whose patterns are freely chosen hy mortals but
governed by Necessity. All of these transcendentals are presented in
the mythical lottery scene that takes place just before the journey to
the waters of forgetfulness whence the souls will eITlbark upon their
new lives on earth. The task set before the reincarnated soul is to
purify herself completely through philosophy (248a-249d). The rest
of the myth describes in symbolic language the role of love in the
pl1ilosophical task. What is really being treated is the dynamic of the
soul in this life, its purification through recollection particularly facilitated by the beautiful which wakens in the soul love or the desire
for the Forms. The n1yth accounts for temperament as the trace of the
god-guardian in the memory of the fallen soul, for attraction in love
as the likeness in the heloved to the god-guardian, for the agonies
of love's longing as the sprouting and growth of the new wings of the
soul, and for the love itself as a seeking of the god perceived in the
beloved (250-257). It should be clear that the topics treated in this
myth, namely, the nature of the soul and of the gods, the pre-existent
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life of the soul, the geography of heaven, the Forms of Truth, the
trial and fall of the soul, the role of necessity and free choice in the
birth of the mortal, the spiritual growth of the mortal through purification by recollection, the relation of the soul to the gods, and the
place of love in the journey of the soul to its reward, are all transcendent, that is, beyond empirical investigation.
What, we must now ask, was the objective of Plato in treating
mythically of these transcendent topics? There are two reasons, clearly stated by Plato through the mouth of Socrates. The first has already
been rnentioned, namely, the cognitive purpose of coming to a deeper
understanding of those things which only a god could reveal. The
second is given at the end of the myth where Socrates exhorts
Phaedrus to true love which leads to "that blessing great and glorious" which he has been describing; prays for hirnself that the god
of love "not take from me the lover's talent wherewith thou has
blessed me"; and prays for Lysias that the god "turn hirn toward the
love of wisdom.... Then ,viII his loving disciple here [PhaedrusJ
no longer halt between two opinions, as now he does, but live for
Love in singleness of purpose with the aid of pllilosophical discourse" (257a, b). Bearing in mind the peculiarity we noted above
in Plato's approach to participation in the divine, we can see that
this passage is important. Plato, unlike the votaries of the Mysteries,
did not believe that the transcendent was reached through ritual
initiation but through philosophical contemplation of the Truth ,·vhich
is a function of recollection and its consequent dialectic inspired by
the love which is stimulated by beauty. (An indication of this attitude
is found in the fact that Plato ranked philosophers, lovers, and
followers of the Muses first and Mystery-priests fifth in his list of
reincarnation patterns. The only men below the Mystery-priests were
imitative artists and craftsmen, sophists and demagogues, and tyrants, for none of whom Plato had much respect.) In other words, for
Plato the cognitive and the rnystical or participative function of rnyth
are really one and the same, for participation is by way of true
knowledge which is salvific. Religion for Plato means just what
philosophy does, assimilation to GOd. 71 This assimilation consists
in imitating the gods through virtue (which is identical with knowledge) and contemplating the Forms (which is likewise identical with
71
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kno,vledge).72 In short, the objective of the myth was knowledge of the
transcendent for the purpose of participation. But such knowledge,
as Plato says at the beginning of the myth, is not attainable except
through the symbolic mode of the mythe Therefore, myth is a necessary element of the Phaedrus in dealing with the transcendent and
achieving the object that Plato had in mind.
There is a clear hint that Plato thought that he had achieved his
objective, or at least that the myth was suitable to its achievement, in
the words with which Phaedrus responds to the myth: "If that be
for our good, Socrates, I join in your prayer for it. And I have this
long while been filled with admiration for your speech as a far finer
achievement than the one you made before" (257c). Phaedrus has
been moved to the love of wisdom.
CONCLUSION

It would be interesting, at this point, to analyze the other myths
of the middle dialogues, namely the myth of Diotima in the Symposium (202d-212a), the myth of Er in the Republic (X, 614b-621d),
and the myth of the upper world in the Phaedo (107c-114c). However, since the detailed analysis of these myths would be overly
repetitious it seems better to summarize them briefly in order to
indicate that Plato's myths in general (not only the Phaedrus myth)
are integral parts of his philosophy, fully justified by their suitability to his task. Therefore, by way of conclusion, we shall glance
briefly at these myths, indicating those elements of mythical form
vvhich are outstanding and which are more prominent here than in
the Phaedrus, tl1e transcendental subject matter with which they deal,
and the objective which Plato seemed to have in mind in using them.
The outstanding characteristics of the mythical form in the Symposium are its non-narrative character and its emphasis on revelation,
brought directly to Socrates by the priestess Diotima (201d). The
subject matter of the myth is the role of love in the pursuit of wisdom, which as we 11ave seen, was an important theme of the Phaedrus
myth. The subject is treated in some depth and the beautiful descrip.
tion of the mystical ascent of love to the ultimate vision of beauty
which confers immortality (210b-212a) is the outstanding feature
of the mythe That this matter is transcendental is obvious for the
72
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mystical ascent is certainly not open to any discursive form of investigation. The soaringly beautiful passage on love and beauty that
the remembering of the doctrine of Diotima calls forth from Socrates as weIl as the speIIbound attention and enthusiastic applause
of his listeners bear witness to the transcendental feeling which the
myth generated and regulated.
The myth of the upper world in the Phaedo and the myth of Er in
the Republic are quite similar to each other in form and content.
The olltstanding feature of the form of the Phaedo myth is the long
and beautiful analogy (beginning l09a) which sets forth the proportion: the upper world is to our world as our world is to the submarine world. The myth of Er makes special use of traditional
mythological lore. Both myths feature a terrestrial eschatology,
much personification, and intricately interconnected image patterns
such as the world-description in the Phaedo (110c-113c) and the
judgment scene at the SpindIe of Necessity in the Republic (616b620e). Both myths are concerned with the continuity between this
life and the next and its necessary corollary of moral responsibility.
The Phaedo is more concerned with the care of the soul in this life
which is necessary to insure happiness in the next (107c), whereas
the Republic is more concerned with the interrelation of free will
and necessity (617e) in the purificatory reincarnations. Both succeed in establishing the transcendental feeling which is the matrix
of understanding and of intellectual participation which are Plato's
objectives in setting these great transcendental themes in a mythical
framework (e.g. Rep. X, 621c).
In the course of this article we have tried to show that the Platonic
myths of the middle dialogues, especially the Phaedrus myth, are
fully justified as integral parts of Plato's philosophy because they
successfully achieve his objective of dealing meaningfully with the
transcendent. Wehave shown this by investigating the peculiar potentialities of myth and exposing Plato's exploitation of these for
his philosophical purposes. The conclusion we have drawn is that,
not only are the myths not inadvertent inconsistencies resulting from
an uncontrollable poetic impetus, but that they are carefully chosen,
beautifully executed, and fully justified masterpieces of philosophical discourse.

